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"VOID" MARRIAGES AND "VOID" LAWS-
ANALOGUES ?t
CHAPLEs P. LIGHT, JR.*
Reasoning from analogy, we are told, can never be regarded as
equivalent to proof. Indeed analogy is not a type of proof' at all.
But it "is commonly accepted as a legitimate ground of inference," as
"the most fruitful source of suggestions, of hypotheses."'1 "The mis-
use of logic or philosophy [or analogy] begins," says Judge Cardozo,
"when its method and its ends are treated as supreme and final."'
Decidedly we shall not be guilty of such misuse. If anything, error
will lie at the other extreme - in claiming nothing for analogy
as a method, in evading even the customary conclusional statement,
in allowing our inferences to remain "in reference,"' despite the stric-
tures of the dissentients in Marcus Brown Company v. Feldman.8
The scope of the paper is indicated by the caption. To answer its
questioning, let us first, consider the existence and basis of a power'
in courts to review legislation, of a power in certain courts to inves-
tigate the validity of marriages; secondly, examine the conditions
upon which such power of review will be exercised over legislation
"'The problem of this paper has been suggested by concurrent use of Mc-
Gov'EY, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1930) and McCuiDY, CASES ON PER-
SONS AND DomESTic RELATIONS (1926). Practically all of the cases which are dis-
cussed herein will be found in one or the other of these excellent selections.
In arrangement, the paper follows that of Professor McGovney in Chapter
I of his casebook. It is substantially the same as that which Professor Noel T.
Dowling once used in his classes, with an added historical emphasis following
Professor James Bradley Thayer (see Mr. McGovney's Preface).
After a fashion, the paper may be considered a partial review of a fresh
presentation of cases upon the law common to American Constitutions.
*Associate Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University School of
Law.
'Paraphrased and quoted from I ENCYCLOPAEDIA BEETANNICA (Wth ed. 1929)
864, 865.
'CA-mozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (121) 46. And see ibid.
30 as justifying the insertion, "or analogy".
*250 U. S. 170, 200, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 466 (192i): "We are not disposed to a
review of the cases. We leave them in reference, as the opinion does, with the
comment that our deduction from them is not -that of the opinion."
4"Ability" would be a substitute. After the usage of Professor E. H. Warren,
either "capacity" or "authority" could be used.
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and over marriages; thirdly, determine the effect of invalidity'a in the
case of legislation and of marriages.
I. EXISTENCE OF POWER
The judicial 'exercise of the power to 'declare an act of legislature
invalid because of conflict with a constitution is a peculiar American
contribution to the science of law.' The roots of the doctrine of judi-
cial review' stretch back to Calvin's Case' and Dr. Bonham's Case,"
where Chief Justice Coke proclaimed that "Parliament could not take
away that protection which the law of nature giveth unto [the sub-
ject] ;" that "when an Act of Parliament is against common right and
reason... the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to
be void." The American colonial judges were merely practicing what
Coke preached when they refused to apply laws thought by them to
be in conflict with fundamental law". The arguments of James
Otis' and George Mason," revolutionary arguments both, invoked
"the Constitution" and "natural right and justice" to strike down
laws. In the state courts after the Revolution the power was exer-
cised, with temporarily uncomfortable results to the Rhode Island
judiciary as graphically told in Trevett v. Weeden." The language
IaThe term is used interchangeably with "unconstitutionality", as applied to
statutes. But Chief Justice O'Neill of Louisiana denies that "validity" in a
constitutional provision is the equivalent of "constitutionality". He said: "there
is no reason to doubt that the omission of the word constitutionality was de-
liberate." His was a dissenting opinion in Roberts v. Evangelineq Parish School
Board, 155 La. 331, 337, 99 So. 280, 282 (1923).
"'A radical difference between the English and the American idea of a Con-
stitution began to emerge from 1761 to 1765... The Americans meant by 'un-
constitutional,' Acts absolutely illegal, Acts which Parliament had no power to
pass and which were to be disregarded by the Courts and by the citizens of
the Colonies." WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CoNsTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1925) 14.
"The principle...is a product of American law, and, though now found in
the jurisprudential systems of some other countries, has nowhere received the
development and extended application that it has received in the United States."
WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed.
1930) 13.
'Professor Corwin's volume bears this title. CoRwiN, THE DOCTRIxNE OF
JUDIc AL Ravimw (1914).
'7 Co. Rep. *ia, *14a (16o8).
88 Co. Rep. *i14a, *ii8a (16io).
'In Paxton's Case of the Writ of Assistance, I Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761).
"In Robin v. Hardaway, I Jeff. iog (Va. 1772).
Il THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1895) 73-78.
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and the decisions of the state judges in favor of the power undoubt-
edly were known to the members of the Convention of 1787.' They
did not insert in the new Constitution a clause providing: the Supreme
Court and the inferior federal courts shall have power to pass upon
the constitutionality of acts of Congress and of state legislatures,
whenever the case is otherwise properly before them.3 It was un-
necessary, since "the Court they were erecting was to possess all the
powers which were exercised by Courts as Courts in the States."'
In Marbury v. Madison," the Supreme Court asserted the exist-
ence of the power, in deciding that it should disregarda an act of
Congress which attempted to enlarge its original jurisdiction. Chief
Justice Marshall rested his decision upon the nature of written funda-
mental law, fortified by express texts: "The judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases.. .,"" "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
.United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land... "" Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania,
dissenting in Eakin v. Raub,8 refused to follow the Chief Justice in
some of his reasoning, thinking that the power to declare an act of
legislature unconstitutional must be expressly granted to a state
court. Otherwise, he was "of opinion that it rests with the people, in
whom full and absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in
legislation, by instructing their representatives to repeal the obnox-
ious act."' But a clear majority of courts which passed upon the
question at all came out strongly in favor of the existence of a power
of judicial review of legislation.
'-WAREN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 43.
"Drafted without benefit of a Committee of Detail or of Style.
"'WREN, op. cit. supra note 5, af 54, 55.
2I Cranch. 137 (U. S. 1803).
albid. 178, where the Chief Justice said: "...the court must either decide
that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably
to the constitution, disregarding the law ..... ." And cf. Chief Justice Taft in
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 37, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 450 (1922): "It is
the high duty and function of this court... to decline to recognize or enforce
seeming laws of Congress..."
"UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIo, Art. III, § 2, Cl. I.
"Ibid. Art. VI. Cl. 2.
"812 S. & R. 330 (Pa. i825).
"Ibid. 355. In the yellowed volume containing the opinion, at p. 346, Vincent
L. Bradford, Esq., the donor, has pencilled: "This opinion is plausible, but
without force. In I Cranch. 175-6 the argument of Marshall, C. J. has the
force of demonstration."
Gibson, J., ibid. 344, prefaced his opinion thus, at 345: "I am aware, that a
right to declare all unconstitutional acts void, without distinction as to either
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Is there a parallel development in the field of nullity of marriage
cases? In England, before 1857,' only the ecclesiastical courts an-
nulled marriages. The states of North America, after the Revolution
as before, possessed no ecclesiastical courts.' The question then
arose, in the absence of any statute expressly conferring the annulling
power upon a court of the state, could any court pronounce sentence
of nullity? Chancellor Kent of New York answered in the affirmative
in Wightman v. Wightian," holding that a court of equity could
annul a marriage between two persons, one of whom was insane at
the time of the ceremony. An argument ex necessitate was made:
"The fitness and propriety of a judicial decision, pronouncing
the nullity of such a marriage, is very apparent, and is equally
conducive to good order and decorum, and to the peace and con-
science of the party. The only question, then, is, To what Court
does the jurisdiction of such a case belong? There must be a
tribunal existing with us competent to investigate such a charge,
and to afford the requisite relief; and the power, I apprehend,
must reside irq this Court..."'
Putting to one side the meaning of "nullity" and substituting "act
of Congress" for "marriage" in the quotation, by a little stretching
one can imagine John Marshall thinking these words when Marbury
v. Madison' was before him for decision.
Following the precedent set by Kent, Chancellor Sandford of New
York, in Ferlat v. Gojon,' annulled a marriage procured by fraud and
duress, although there was no statute expressly conferring such power.
He thought "[i]t would be deplorable, that in a case of fraud so
constitution, is generally held as a professional dogma; but, I apprehend, rather
as a matter of faith than of reason. I admit that I once embraced the same
doctrine, but without examination...."
See BEARD AND BEARD, THE AmERIcAN LEVIATHAN (1930) 30-33 for an
illuminating discussion of "Interpretation by the Rational Method", Marshall's
favorite method.
W2 HALSBURy, THE LAws OF ENGLAND (1910) 505: "During the nineteenth
century the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was considerably curtailed...
[T]heir jurisdiction in matrimonial causes was transferred to the newly estab-
lished Divorce Court," by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857.
'Anonymous, 24 N. J. Eq. 19, 24 (873), quoting from 2 BisHO-, MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE (4 th ed. 1864) § 291.
'-4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y. 182o).
'Ibid. 346. To the same effect see 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AtIERICAN
LAW (Ilth ed. 1867) -39, 40.
-'Supra note 15.
2I Hopk. Ch. 478 (N. Y. 1825).
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gross, there should be no adequate remedy."' Again the appeal to
necessity as a justification.
The early American cases wherein courts held statutes unconstitu-
tional, were the product of revolutionary arguments, arguments from
necessity. How else could James Otis attack the "writ of assist-
ance" ? Necessity, it seems, is at times also the mother of jurisdic-
tion. So, the early decisions of the New York chancellors annulling
marriages were the offspring of necessity. In more recent times, a
New Jersey chancellor annulled a marriage-in-jest, although he ad-
mitted that "[a] literal construction of these acts and constitutional
provisions, would not seem to vest in this court the power of declar-
ing marriages void, except in the cases specified..."' He applied the
method of Kent to the interpretation of statutes and constitution
and reached the same conclusion.
However surprising geographically, in one state at least, the revo-
lutionary argument from necessity did not prevail. South Carolina's
court of equity, in Mattison v. Mattison,' refused to declare a mar-
riage void on the ground that the complainant was suffering from
delirium tremens at the time of the ceremony. The reason given was,
that such cases were cognizable in England by the ecclesiastical courts
alone, that there was no state statute conferring ecclesiastical jurisdic-
tion upon the equity court, hence it could not act.
There is wisdom in Kent's argument that, inasmuch as a court of
equity will annul ordinary contracts where there was fraud, it should
do the same in the case of marriages, where necessity demands that
a decree issue. This is not quite the same kind of necessity as that
which led the early judges to hold legislation invalid. But in so far as
legislation clearly conflicts with specific provisions of a written con-
stitution, the public necessity would seem to require that some court
adjudge the fact. When invalidity hinges upon one of the vaguer
clauses, like Due Process, the necessity argument in constitutional
cases is less clear.'
An outstanding case of a change of heart as to the existence of
power to review legislation is that of Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania.
'Ibid. 495. Here the chancellor also stated: "In England, the ecclesiastical
courts would have cognizance of such a question, and would annul the marriage;
but it seems, that even in England, the court of chancery would also have juris-
diction of such a case, as a fraud." But Moss v. Moss, [1897] P. D. 263, refutes
this.
-True, the writ issued despite Otis' appeal to "The Constitution".
'Zabriskie, C., in McClurg v. Terry, 21 N. J. Eq. 225, 229 (870).
_i Strobh. Eq. 387 (S. C. x846).
'See Frankfurter, A Note op Advisory Ophions (924) 37 H~Av. L. REv. ioo2.
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Twenty years after his dissent in Eakin v. Raub,' the learned' chief
justice, during the argument in Norris v. Clymer," spoke in favor of
the power for two reasons of which the second was: "...from ex-
perience of the necessity of the case."' The necessity. mentioned here
is referable, it would seem, to a belief that the legislature could not
be trusted to restrain itself agreeably to the constitution.
Following a familiar classification,' interests which lead to recogni-
tion of a power in equity courts to annul marriages are these: (a)
individual interests of the parties in "peace and conscience", honor,
peace of mind, probably in property matters, possibly of children in
their status; (b) a social interest in "good order and decorum" of
members of the community; (c) a public interest in the conservation
of the courts' time,' by settling once for all the question whether a
marriage is valid.
Corresponding interests in the case of disregarding legislation are
these: (a) an individual interest in protection against encroachments
by government, often upon property; (b) a social interest in favor of
exercising the power of judicial review, often in favor of giving legis-
latures a freer rein to-permit experimentation; (c) possibly, a slight
public interest in judicial time saving.
Accepting Mr. Epaphroditus Peck's statement that "[t] he statutes
of nearly all the states define as causes for divorce facts which really
made the marriage a nullity from the beginning,"' the foregoing dis-
cussion of general equity jurisdiction to annul marriages perhaps will
"Supra note I8.
'Used in all sincerity, both here and hereafter.
"2 Pa. 277 (x846).
'Ibid. 281. To insure fairness to Judge Gibson, let it be said that in Eakin
v. Raub, supra note I8, at 356, he did admit the existence of the power whenever
there should arise "monstrous violations of the constitution", "such as taking
away the right of trial by jury, the elective franchise, or subverting religious
liberty." But any such changes, he thought, would amount to "a revolution,
which, to counteract, would justify even insurrection; consequently, a judge
might lawfully employ every instrument of official resistance within his reach.
"... [W]hile the citizen should resist with pike and gun, the judge might cooper-
ate with habaeas corpus and snandamns."
'See Pound, Interests of Personality (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 445. But
the application is obviously the writer's.
'Cf. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, (1920) 33 HaRv. L. REv.
633, 640: "...the court can give to the tracing of the consequences of any par-
ticular act only its fair share of all the available time, considering the other acts
which are waiting its attention."
'PEcK, THE LAW OF PERSONS AND OF DoEaSTc RELATIONS (3rd ed. 193o)
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have lost its appeal for the utilitarian, and must look for sympathetic
response to the historically minded. But constitutional review is not
covered by constitutional provisions, save negatively through limita-
tions upon its exercise.
'In Colorado, it was provided that judicial review should be exercisable only
by the state supreme court, subject to approval or rejection by the people. This
constitutional provision was held invalid as to federal questions in People v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 70 Colo. 9o, I98 Pac. 146 (I92I), and as to state
questions in People v. Max, 7o Colo. ioo, 198 Pac. i5o (1921). In North Da-
kota, a decision of unconstitutionality is no longer a matter ,of majority vote,
but at least four of the five judges of the supreme court must concur. This pro-
vision of the constitution was sustained without much discussion in Daly v.
Beery, 45 N. D. 287, 178 N. W. 1O4 (192o). Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania
once might have agreed with these remarks of Robinson, J., at 3o6, 178 N. W.,
at III: "The power which cdurts have assumed, by a bare majority of one, to
hold void acts of Congress and legislative enactments, may soon be a thing of
the past. If the court have the power, by any majority, to hold void an act
submitted to and approved by the people, the power is too dangerous and arro-
gant for use, except on occasions very extraordinary." (Italics are the writer's.)
But the remarks are in conflict with the more optimistic view, expressed in
THE NATION while the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1872), were
under fire: "...the value of a judgment does not depend on the number of
Judges who concur in it-Judges being weighed, not counted..." 3 WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (I924) 247. In Ohio, it
takes the concurrence of "at least all but one" of the supreme court judges to
upset a law, save where the intermediate court of appeals has upset it first. The
provision was applied in DeWitt v. State, io8 Ohio St. 513, 141 N. E. 551
(1923). See particularly the Note in the Syllabus by the Court, at 514, 141
N. E., at 551.
No reference to these or similar limiting provisions has been found in STIM-
SON, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES (i9o8). In 12 C. J. 779 (917), it is said: "In some jurisdictions, cer-
tain inferior courts are forbidden by constitutional or statutory provisions to
pass on the constitutionality of statutes." Illinois cases are cited. Mr. Warren
has discussed the North Dakota and Ohio provisions in his chapter on '"Minority
Decisions", op. cit. supra note 5, i86-igo. And see McGovNEY, CAsES ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1930) 64-68 and notes.
Are "the people" of the twentieth century coercing the justices, as the jus-
tices of the fourteenth century used to coerce those of the people who happened
to be jurors? Cf. Anonymous Case, 41 Lib. Assisarum II (1367), also in
POUND & PLUCKNETT, READINGS IN THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COM-
MON LAW (3rd ed. 1927) 155, 156: "In another assise before the same justices
at Northampton, the assise was sworn; and they all agreed but one, who would
not agree with the xi, and afterwards they were remanded, and remained all
day and the next day without eating or drinking, and afterwards the justices
demanded of him if he would agree with his companions, and he said never, for
he would die first in prison. Wherefore they took the verdict of the xi and
commanded him to prison..."
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II. EXERCISE OF POWER
Turning from the existence of a power of judicial review to its
exercise, ifJ is common learning that a "case or controversy" is neces-
sary in the federal courts before judicial power can attach3 The
Supreme Court of the United States "has steadily set its face from
the beginning"' against the giving of "merely advisory"' opinions
upon the constitutionality of legislation. The practice in the supreme
courts of several states includes the giving of such opinions." It has
not escaped criticism: "The accidents of litigation may give time for
the vindication of laws which a priori may run counter to deep pre-
possessions or speculative claims of injustice."'  The longer a law
thought constitutionally doubtful when enacted is given a chance to
prove itself in actual practice, the less the likelihood that it will later
be declared invalid"-a sort of perverse" but benevolent laches.
In the case of long continued delay in instituting proceedings to
annul a marriage for impotency, where there was ground all along
to do so, courts will decline to grant relief. The chancellor will look
at the marriage and at the time elapsed and may decide not to "meddle
with what the party complaining shows by conduct through a con-
siderable series of years to be no grievance."" There is this dif-
ference between the two cases. In the constitutional case, the com-
plainant does not lose a right he would otherwise have had because
of his own insincerity, the rule in the marriage case. Rather, because
of the passage of time, relief originally certain against questionable
legislation, may be denied. It is not the loss of a "right", but the
denial of the existence of a constitutional "wrong".
"Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 250 (1911).
"Ibid. 362, 31 Sup. Ct., at 256.
"Mr. Justice Stone in Fidelity Nat. Bank. & Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123,
134, 47 Sup. Ct. 511, 515 (1927).
"Hudson, Advisory Opinions of Nntional and International Courts (1924) 37
HARV. L. REv. 97o, 977 and 978.
"Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 3o, at IOO5, being a caveat to the article
cited supra note 42.
"Moreover, a decision of invalidity may be reversed, where to "hold the acts...
invalid must cause, throughout the country, great business derangement, wide-
spread distress, and the rankest injustice." Practically speaking, there was
reversal in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 529 (1872).
"WARREN, op. Cit. supra note 38, at 243: "Of course, the answer to all this
[i. e., the quotation supra note 44] was, that the Court should not concern itself
with 'consequences'..."
"Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, 92 N. J. Eq. 7, 15, 111 Ad. 697, 700 (1920).
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The constitutional issue may be raised by violating the law," "suf-
fering prosecution, defending upon the ground of invalidity; by suit
to restrain enforcement of the statute;" by suit for a declaratory
judgment upon constitutionality;" upon petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. As Professor McGovney has pointed out,6" some courts allow
the writ of habeas corpus to issue before criminal trial, in order to
test the constitutionality of the statute which the defendant is alleged
to have violated. But some have refused the writ for the same pur-
pose, after trial and conviction. Here, failure to act seasonably
merely results in defendant's inability to use a speedy isolation method
of settling the constitutional question. It does not amount to the loss
of all claim to relief, as in the nullity cases mentioned' above, but to
the loss of a particular remedy.
III. EFFECT OF INVALIDITY
Having considered the existence and modes of exercise of power
in courts to pass upon the validity of marriages and of laws, next
we shall determine the effect in each case of a decision of invalidity
with a view to making comparisons. The terms "void" and "voidable"
will furnish a starting and focal point for the essay.
a. Marriages-Void or Voidable?
What is the meaning of void marriage? Blackstone meant, one
entered into where there were civil disabilities' which "previously
hinder the junction". Nonage was a disability of this sort. Even so,
when the party under age reached the age of consent, he (she) might
"disagree and declare the marriage void, without any divorce or sen-
tence in the spiritual court."' On the other hand, voidable marriages
to Blackstone were those which were required to be set aside by sen-
tence of the ecclesiastical court. Canonical disabilities," for example
"Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 27 Sup. Ct 188 (1907).
"Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U. S.
418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
"See Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment (1928)
14 A. B. A. J. 633.
"In a note which collects the cases. McGovN-Y, op. cit. supra note 38, at i99.
"Classified as follows: "I. Impediments... a prior marriage, or having an-
other husband or wife living... 2. Age.. .want of age... 3. Assent of others
... want of consent of parents or guardians... 4. Mental capacity.. .want of
reason..." z Bi- Commit. (4th Cooley ed. 1899) *435-439.
"Ibid. *436.
"Blackstone's complete list: precontract, consanguinity, affinity and "some
particular corporal infirmities." Ibid. *434-
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consanguinity, he says, "only make the marriage voidable, and not
ipso facto void, until sentence of nullity be obtained."
Perhaps misapplying Blackstone's language that a marriage where
one of the parties was under the age of consent'was void,' the Su-
preme Court of Ohio, in Shafher, v. The State, held that this meant
the marriage was not a marriage "until confirmed by cohabitation
after arriving at the age of consent."' The lower court had charged
"that unless he dissented from the contract on arriving at such age,
and gave the wife notice of the fact, he could not avoid it." The
supreme court's answer to this was: "We think acts of assent after
age must be shown to bind him."'  However, in the Alabamal case of
Beggs v. The State," the view of the Ohio trial court was followed: a
marriage between persons not of the age of consent is "imperfect, be-
coming perfect only by affirmance when the requisite age is obtained.
Until disaffirmance, it is a marriage in fact, and the second marriage
of either party is bigamy."'
Blackstone, in other words, used "void" and "voidable" with refer-
ence to court action: a void marriage needed none to declare it void, a
voidable marriage was an avoidable marriage, one which required a court
decree to set it aside. However, both the Ohio case and the case from
Alabama treat marriages under age as voidable in an analytical sense:
one following the contracts usage of valid until disaffirmed," the
other (having a faint agency tinge), invalid unless affirmed. In
neither was court action necessary to affirmance or disaffirmance.
Support for the view taken in Shafher v. 'The Stateo seems to be
found in Wightman v. Wightnuan." In the latter case the ceremony
was performed when the wife was insane. The chancellor said:
"Further along, Blackstone said: "...t his marriage is only inchoate and im-
perfect; and, when either of them comes to the age of consent aforesaid, they
may disagree and declare the marriage void, without any divorce or sentence
in the spiritual court.1 Ibid. *436.
12o Ohio r, 6 (1851).
"Ibid. 7. This view may have been taken because at the time Ohio law fur-
nished "no method of obtaining a judicial sentence for annulling such a mar-
riage; unless the parties have the means of escape in their own hands, none
exist." Ibid. 6. This is but a differing manifestation of the argument from
necessity.
""55 Ala. io8 (1876).
'Ibid. 113.
aI WILLISTON, CoNTRcrs (1920) 14: "Unless rescinded, however, a voidable
contract imposes on the parties the same obligation as if it were not voidable."
O'Supra note 55.
'2Supra note 22.
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"...though such marriages be ipso facto void, yet it is proper
that there should be a judicial decision to thateffect..."" What is
the meaning of ipso facto void? A total nullity, so that no act of a
party can improve thd situation? No, for even "if a party contracted
marriage when a lunatic," if he later "agreed to it, and consummated
it, in a lucid interval, it would be good."' Thius, the marriage is void
if so declared by a court, and void if the insanity remains (ipso facto),
but is capable of ratification by later lucid consent given by the for-
merly incompetent party.
Recapitulating," a marriage, imperfect because of nonage, insanity,
duress, fraud, or mistake, is said to be void. No decree of nullity
or other court action is necessary to set it aside. The parties by their
conduct may disaffirm the marriage. In this sense it is voidable. So
they may (must under, Shafher v. The State") affirm it by their con-
duct.
A marriage, defective because of impotency or consanguinity, is
voidable, ' is "valid for all civil purposes unless sentence of nullity be
obtained in the lifetime of the parties."" Court action is necessary to
set it aside. Otherwise, by acquiescence it may be validated forever.
By their personal conduct alone the parties cannot disaffirm the mar-
riage.
This should be noted: a marriage, under any of the several dis-
abilities considered above, is given some effect. In no case is the
situation of the parties after the ceremony what it would have been
had no "marriage" taken place.
"Supra note 22, at 345.
"Supra note 2, at 345, citing Ash's case, Prec. Ch. 2D3, I Eq. Cas. Abr. 278, pl.
6. (702).
"See the Introduction to MAY, MARRIAGE LAWS AND DECiSiONS (1929) 8-io.
This Manual should prove invaluable. Witness its scope: "It attempts only to
.combine comprehensively under a uniform set of headings all the statutory
regulations of marriage and all the pertinent court decisions relating to mar-
riage, within the limits to be explained, in each jurisdiction of the continental
United States." (Italics are the writer's.)
"Snpra note 55..
"But Kent said, "unlawful, ab initio..." Supra note 22, at 348.
"Bowers v. Bowers, io Rich. Eq. 551, 556 (S. C. 1858). And to the same
effect as to impotency, see Steerman v. Snow, 94 N. J. Eq. 9, x18 At. 696
(1922). "Whether a marriage between persons within the prohibited degree
of relationship is void is a'question on which decisions differ, the difference
often resting on the -varying terms of the respective statutes." PECK, op. cit
supra note 37, at 140.
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b. Laws (Marriages)-the Nature of the Renwdy
Before discussing the meaning of "void" as a prefix to "law", it
will be well to look at the nature of the remedy where the law is
alleged to be of this kind. Let the cases speak for themselves. "The
function of the judicial department with respect to legislation; deemed
unconstitutional is not exercised in rem, but always in personam.""
"[T]he decision affects the parties only, and there is no judgment
against the statute."' A "former decision can not be pleaded as an
estoppel, but can be relied on only as a precedent."" True, "all people...
ought and usually do consider that particular question as settled and
binding; but this is only so by... [reasog of ] the credence which the
people have in the opinions of such courts." '
This language may be applied as well to the case of collateral at-
tack upon the validity of a marriage alleged to be defective for some
civil reason like fraud or lack of consent. The solution of the issue
in the collateral proceeding' may hinge upon the validity of the mar-
riage. The court then "pronounces the marriage valid or void, only
for the purpose of deciding the particular suit in which the question
arises; and the decision is conclusive, for no other purpose. The
question... may be again and again litigated, in other suits and in
other courts; and it may receive different decisions from different
tribunals."' As "[a] statute unconstitutional properly remains on the
statute books as a part of the written law,"7' so a marriage pro-
nounced invalid in a collateral proceeding is yet a marriage and may
be held valid in other proceedings.
There is one case, Miller v. State Entomologist, whose language
goes far toward giving an effect "quasi in rem" to a decision that a
statute is valid. In this case a Virginia statute was attacked on
6".Lang v. Mayor of Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 459, 68 AtI. go, 92 (i9O7). See
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning
(1917) 26 YALE L. J. 71o, for criticism of these Latin phrases and of their use.
"Shephard v. Wheeling, 3o W. Va. 479, 483, 4 S. E. 635, 637 (1887).
"Ibid.
"Norwood v. Goldsmith, i68 Ala. 224, 235, 53 So. 84, 87 (19io).
7"... such as prosecutions for bigamy, actions of dower, suits in which marital
rights are claimed, or any other proceeding involving the legality of the mar-
riage." Ferlat v. Gojon, supra note 25, at 494.
"Ferlat v. Gojon, supra note 22, at 494.
"State of Iowa v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 520, 126 N. W. 454, 456 (igio). And
see Shephard v. Wheeling, supra note 69, at 483, to the effect that a court de-
cision of invalidity "does not strike the statute from the statute-book..."
"x46 Va. 175, 135 S. E. 813 (Ig26).
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various grounds, but its constitutionality was upheld. The late Judge
Burks' opinion reads:
"The same objections [to the statute] and some others have
been raised in the instant case. So far as the facts of the two
cases are thd same, the Bowman Case [upholding the statute]
stands until reversed. All objections to the constitutionality of
the statute are concluded by the Bowman Case, whether brought
to the attention of the court in that case or not."'
The Judge reasons:
"This must be so of necessity, for if a statute is unconstitu-
tional for any reason,, it is a void statute, and 'whenever a
statute is enforced by a judgment or decree of a court, it is a
judicial determination that the statute is a valid enactment and
is free from all constitutional objections.""
This conclusion hardly jibes with the accepted theory regarding
the functions of a supreme court in a constitutional case, thus ex-
pressed by Mr. John W. Davis: "...surely they do not go one step
beyond the administration of justice to individual litigants.'"' Pro-
fessor Hudson's narrative:' continues:
"But Lord Birkenheadt"] found Mr. Davis' refinement 'a little
subtle', and expressed the view that 'when an issue challenged
by an individual raises the question whether a law is constitu-
tional or not the decision of the Supreme Court [of the United
States] decides this question for all time, and if the decision is
against the legislature the attempted law is stripped of its at-
tempted authority.'"
Judge Burks' opinion, like that of the late Lord Chancellor, may por-
tray more accurately the realities (probabilities) of the case,' an esti-
mate extenuatory not affirmative.
"eSupra note 75, at 18o, 135 S. E., at 814. With the last clause of the quota-
tion cf. GprEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) 22: "There can be no such thing as
acceptable lump-sum judgments on complex transactions. Complicated data can
ohly be handled reliably by breaking them into parts and examining them bit
by bit." and see Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting
the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Actionr (1924) 38 HARV. L. REv. 6.
"Supra note 75, at i8o, 135 S. E., at 814. (Italics are the writer's.)
"'Hudson, op. cit. supra note 42, at 974, quoting from (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 553,
557. "'Ibid. quoting from (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 553, 579.
"An Associated Press dispatch from London, Sept. 30, i93o, reads: "The
Earl of Birkenhead (F. E. Smith), a lawyer and politician and one of the most
romantic (Lord High Chancellor at 47) and colorful figures in British public
life, died from pneumonia today. He was 58 years old."
'See the Note, What is the Effect of a Court's Declaring a Legislative Act
Unconstitutionalf (1926) 39 HAv L. Ray. 373.
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Shifting to marriages, where a decree of annulment is secured, "the
proceeding is in rein, strictly so called; it is upon the matter of the
marriage, to determine simply whether suclh marriage exists... And
when a determination is had in a proceeding in rein, it binds the whole
world and not only the parties to it; it makes it a marriage or no
marriage."" Superficially, the nearest thing to such proceeding in
the case of legislation is the declaratory judgment. But the assumed
similarity is imaginary, for a declaration of unconstitutionality binds
only as far as does a decision in the ordinary case or controversy."
c. Laws (Marriages)- Analysis of Invalidity
In contemplating the effects of unconstitutionality the first dictum
which comes to mind is that of Mr. Justice Field: "An unconstitu-
tional act is not a law ;... it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative
as though it had, never been passed."'" Elsewhere, Professor Tooke
has demonstrated that this sweeping assertion was not necessary to
the decision of the case. Still it remains, receiving succor from an-
other precept, "all persons are presumed to know the law,"" meaning
all persons are presumed to know whether the law is constitutional
or unconstitutional, and "if they act under an unconstitutional enact--
ment of the legislature, they do so at their peril, and must take the
consequences."" As applied to officers of the law who have arrested
persons under an act which has "passed the legislature with every
formula of law," this is hard doctrine. An Alabama case admits as
'McClurg v. Terry, supra note 28, at 227, 228 (187o),
"'Except for such coercive decree, the judgment differs in no essential respect
from any other judgment between opposing parties. The judgment merely de-
clares the rights of the parties on formal complaint or petition, as in any other
suit, without necessarily invoking the sheriff's process of execution." Borchard,
op. cit. supra note 49, at 633. Professor Borchard says that some twenty-three
states have now adopted the procedure (1928).
According to 9 U. L. A., Supplement, 1929, fourteen states have adopted the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
"Norton v..Shelby County, ii8 U. S. 425, 442, 6 Sup. Ct 112I, 1125 (x886).
"Tooke, De Facto Municipal Corporations Under Unconstitutional Statutes
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 935, 945.
"Summer v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341, 342 (1875).
"Ibid. It is not entirely clear whether the officers who made the arrest acted
before or after the act in question was declared unconstitutional. The act was
passed Feb. 27, 1873 and was held invalid in an opinion filed "November Term,
1873". Inasmuch as "the defendants answered... in justification under the...
said law", the inference is that they arrested plaintiff before any declaration
of invalidity.
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much by calling this "a presumption often violent but always neces-
sary.
' '
Judges have laid restraining hands upon the full implications of
the dictum in the Norton case.' Starting, we may assume, with the
equally respectable dictum that "every possible presumption is in
favor of the validity of an act of" the legislature "until overcome
beyond rational doubt,"' the North Carolina Supreme Court ha held
that officers are protected against punishment for complying with a
statute later declared unconstitutional. They say:
"Until the subsequent statute was declared to be unconstitu-
tional by competent authority, the defendants, under every idea
of justice and under our theory of government, had a right to
presume that the law making powet had acted within the bounds
of the Constitution, and their highest duty was to obey.""
Again, it has been held" that a sheriff, acting under a warrant fair on
its face, is protected, although the warrant issued pursuant to the
terms of an ordinance subsequently declared unconstitutional. The
distinction is "observed between mere excess of jurisdiction and the
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter"' in the court
issuing the warrant.
The dictum in Norton v. Shelby County," that an unconstitutional
law is as inoperative as though it had never been passed, could mean
that the law was a complete zero before any court decision. Whaf
the case decides is, that upon the facts retrospective operation must
be given to the decision of invalidity. Language fully as emphatic
as Mr. Justice Field's appears in a Florida case:
"...the constitution by its dominant force renders the enact-
ment inoperative ab initio, and bonds issued thereunder are void
because issued without authority of law."
This court likewise gave retrospective effect to its decision, where
action under the law in question took place before any court had
passd upon its validity. That it would not press this view too far,
"Norwood v. Goldsmith, supra note 71, at 234, 53 So., at 87.
"Supra notq 84.
"Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 544, 43 Sup. Ct 394, 396
(923).
"State v. Goodwin, 123 N. C. 697, 7o, 31 S. E. 221, = (1898). (Italics
are the writer's.)
"Rush v. Buckley, ioo Maine 322, 61 At. 774 (19o5).
"Supra note 9a, at 331, 61 Ad., at 778.
"Supra note 84.
"State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 259, 102 So. 739, 743 (1924).
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however, is apparent from the admission in the opinion that "[r] ights
acquired under a statute while it is duly adjudged to be constitutional
are valid legal rights that are protected..."' But, if the constitution
"operates to make the statute void from its enactment,"' after a
primary decision, why does it affect the law only prospectively where
the judges upon second thought have changed their minds? Twisting
a metaphor, a possible explanation is, that those mistaken for judicial
absolutists are at heart but pragmatists in absolutist clothing.'a Even
they, during the palmier days of the ab initio regime, scarcely would
have made allusion to an unconstitutional law as "a statute which is
itself immoral.""
Additional instances of a gentler doctrine as to the effect of in-
validity are found in Sessums v. Botts," from Texas, and Shephard
v. Wheeling,"® from West Virginia. The Texas courts adopts this
sane view:
"It is true that when an act has been declared unconstitutional,
then it is as though it had never been; but we' do not think that
the author in the text [Judge Cooley], or the cases cited by him,
intended to announce the doctrine that an unconstitutional law
could be no protection to officers or citizens, before the same had
been passed upon and adjudged invalid."'"
Here is a wholehearted declaration that prospective effect will be
given to the decision of invalidity, without the temporal qualification
of Nuveen v. GreerY The upshot of the Texas case is that the un-
constitutiona law is not strictly speaking void. It affords protection,
it is valid until declared invalid, and such invalidity is forward look-
ing. To quote from the West Virginia decision:
"Respect for the Legislature, therefore, concurs with well-
established principles of law in thd conclusion that such act is
not void, but voidable only...
Decrees of annulment ofl marriage once operated ab initio to make
"Supra note 95, at 265, io2 So., at 745.
"Supra note 95, at 264, 102 So., at 745.
aCf. CARDOZO, op. cit. supra, at o2.
'Collins, J., in Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 40, 97 N. W.
454, 458 (19o3). The words were used in holding unconstitutional a sugar
bounty law. This may explain their heat
"34 Texas 335 (1871).
1
'8Supra note 69.
" Supra note 99, at 349.
"8Supra note 95.
1
'8Supra note 69, at 484, 4 S. E., at 638.
VOID MARRIAGES AND VOID LAWS
the offspring illegitimate. 0 Statutory enactments in the United States
have altered this rigorous rule by providing for prospective operation
from the date of the decree:' What has been done by legislatures for
annulment decrees may properly be done by courts themselves when
they declare laws invalid. Chancellor Kent went far in holding'e that
equity should, take jurisdiction to decree nullity of marriage, without
a statute so providing. It would have been too much to expect him
to depart from the canon law model and, ex proprio vigore, decree
prospective nullity. But McLain, J., in Iowa v. O'Neir°" did not think
it too much to give only prospective operation to his declaration that
a law was unconstitutional: "If we should sustain the conviction
[by giving retrospective effect to the decision of invalidity], we would
do so in the belief that the case was one in which executive clemency
ought to be exercised.' ° He declined to pass the burden along to the
governor, but assumed it himself. Chancellor Kent had not as free a
hand to alter the nature of nullity decrees; their scope was well defined
years before. But a decision of unconstitutionality, peculiarly Ameri-
can," need not have so crystallized a content. "In considering this
question," also, "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding.""'
In the absence of other solutions, unless prospective effect be given
to a decision of unconstitutionality, hardshi1 is bound to follow. The
self-imposed canons of interpretation,. under which courts avoid
holding a law invalid, implicity recognize this. To give an ab initio
effect to the invalidity of a law is harsher at times than it is to apply
the doctrine of trespass ab initio to the acts of an officer entering
premises under an authority granted by law. The remarks of Pro-
fessor Bohle4 and Mr. Shulman, "'1 with interpolations, are pertinent
here:
"
0See Wolf v. Wolf, iii Misc. 391, 181 N. Y. Supp. 368 (Sup. Ct. 192o)
(nonage), and Bowers v. Bowers, supra note 67 (consanguinity).
"'See for example, Perkey v. Perkey, 87 W. Va. 656, lo6 S. E. 40 (1921).
206In Wightman v. Wightman, supra note 22.
1 0Supra note 74.
18Supra note 74, at 521, 126 N. W., at 456.
"But increasingly less so, as is pointed out in WAmREN, op. cit, supra note 5,
at 161.
"'Marshall, C. J., in 2MCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 407 (18ig).
2mCOOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LmniTATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) c. VII. i THAYEm,
op. cit. supra note ii, at 171, calls these, "administrative rules in constitutional
law".
"'Bohlen and Shulman, Effect of Subsequent Misconduct Upon A Lawful Ar-
rest (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 841, 849.
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"Certainly the fictiont" l of trespass [invalidity] ab initio ought
to be banishedL" 4 .. , from the law... The argument against its
retention as a deterrent to official [legislative] misconduct has
already been set forth above."
It is not usual to justify invalidity ab initio by calling it a deterrent
to the enactment of fewer unconstitutional laws by legislatures. Such
is an inarticulate possibility.
What can be done to assuage the hardship produced by retrospec-
tive invalidity where courts apply that rule? One situation stands out.
The defendant has violated a statute of the state. Upon complaint,
a magistrate issues a warrant, fair on its face for plaintiff's arrest.
The sheriff executes the warrant. After his release, plaintiff sues the
sheriff for false imprisonment. The sheriff defends upon the statute
creating the offense. Plaintiff counters by attacking the validity of
the statute. A court taking the strict view of unconsitutionality will
hold the sheriff liable in damages.' We thus have the spectacle of
the executive arm of the government being made to suffer for an act
enjoined by the judicial branch, consonant to the solemn act of the
legislative department, as a result of a later conclusion reached by the
supreme judicial branch. This is "separation of powers".
In another type of case the unfortunate results of imposing liability
upon the officer have been portrayed:
"A health officer, for example, who in good faith believes a
horse to have glanders or anthrax and thereupon orders it shot
may, on the verdict of a lay jury that he was mistaken, find him-
self subjected to heavy damages, without support or sympathy
"'Or, "presumption often violent but always necessary," Norwood v. Gold-
smith, supra note 88.
"'From here the sentence reads: "at least from the law of arrest."
'Sumner v. Beeler, supra notes 86 and 87, semble. TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am.
L. Inst. 1927) TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, io2 reads: "Special Note: The early
American cases held with substantial unanimity that a person serving a warrant
of a court takes the risk that the court had actual jurisdiction to issue it and
was liable if the court had not jurisdiction, irrespective of the reason for its
lack thereof." For a criticism of this rule in Igio, see (igio) 13 H.Av. L. Rxv.
4o7, commencing: "The liability of an officer who executes a law which it later
held void is one of the unsatisfactory phases of the American doctrine of un-
constitutional legislation." The ToRTs RESTATEMENT, supra, at 99, reftuses to
follow this rule: "...it is immaterial whether the invalidity of the statute or
ordinance is due... (c) to the fact that the statute or ordinance is unconstitu-
tional is offending any clause.. .other than a lause which restricts the juris-
diction which the State can confer upon the courts, bodies or officials created
and appointed by it."
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from the Government, with the result that his successors or col-
leagues will probably decline thereafter to assume such risks and
will permit the community at large to bear the risk and the dan-
ger... This defective social engineering can only be rightly im-
proved by placing the risk of honest official mistakes upon the
community, where it properly belongs."'"
But the risk of just such evil results is appreciable as well, where
officers are penalized for failing to guess properly the constitutionality
of the operative statute. Diagnosticians of the validity of statutes are
not more numerous among sheriffs, than prognosticators of equine
diseases among health officers.
Likewise then, in the case of the unconstitutional statute, the sug-
gestion is made that the burden of loss should not be placed upon the
sheriff (retrospectivity), nor be thrown back upon the citizen ar-
rested (prospectivity), but should be rested upon the state, the com-
munity, as a kind of insurance against the legitimate human errors
which servants in its three branches are prone to make. Should such
liability tend to improve the quality of the public service, having made
the social pocket nerve to twitch, so much the better. Adapting Pro-
fessor Borchard's thesis to the present case, "whether... this con-
clusion [be reached] upon a theory of respondeat superior or upon a
theory of community assumption and distribution of risk for acci-
dents and negligence in the public service,...a community that has
been able to appreciate the sound public policy and efficiency of
workmen's compensation legislation,"' " should cease lending a deaf
ear. It has been said that "[l]iability for conduct follows, usually
belatedly, popular conceptions of justice."' Then it is not too soon
to speak here, where liability is belated, where popular conceptions
as well seem to lag.
The solution of community responsibility seems fairer than that of
immunity for the officer, since the correlative of his immunity is a
disability in the citizen arrested. It may be urged that half a loaf is
better than none, that, prospectivity is a sound principle, hence the
officer should be protected. But this is not a question whether half
a loaf is better than none, rather, whether one half loaf is to be pre-
ferred to the other half of the same loaf.
1
"Borchard,, Government Liability i Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. I, 129, 229,
at 8.
"'lbid. 258. And see Smith, Frolic and Detour (923) 23 CoL L. REv. 444,
716.
2"Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective? (927) 41 HARv. L. Rzv. I,
28.
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Realization of state responsibility'a is so remote as to be fanciful,
it may be objected. If so, and remaining the while in the realm of
fancy, consider: as an alternative to the solution by way of immunity
to the officer, as a substitute for direct community responsibility,
would an enterprising agglomeration like Lloyd's sponsor the in-
surance of officers against the risks of unconstitutionality? "Insur-
ances against outbreak of war, against changes in State Adminis-
trators when elections are pending, against changes in an elected as-
sembly which may prejudice or advantage the interests of the as-
sured, all come within the scope of Lloyd's."'
No great objections of policy are perceived to insurance in the
narrow field here suggested. If, however, the insurance were ex-
tended to cases of industrial or social legislation generally, there is
doubt. It could be objected that the possibly large sum which the
insurer would stand to lose by a court decision of unconstitutionality
might influence him to use undesirable pressure toward suppressing
litigation. The objection of a learned acquaintance is that "the situ-
ation of the sheriff does not seem to be very serious or likely to arise
sufficiently often as to warrant the proposal of any new form of
insurance"; that the case "can be better dealt with by reliance on the
legislative branch for appropriation to cover damages which he has
had to pay for his official acts." In any event, to conclude the par-
tial excursus, the statutory "mortality" tables would provide inter-
esting legal reading. The table for Acts of Congress held unconsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court of the United 'States would be astonish-
ingly short: from 1789 to 1924, according to Mr. Charles Warren's
compilation, "there have actually been held unconstitutional only
forty-nine Acts of Congress and one Joint Resolution."'
d. Comparison and Contrast
Contrasting a law alleged to be unconstitutional to a marriage
under a civil disability, we have seen that a court does not adjudge
in rem against the law, although it does so against the marriage. No
conduct of a party subject to the law can directly affect its validity. He
'aSee (931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 432.
'WRIGHT AND FAYLE, A HIsToRY OF LLoYD'S (1928) 442. Since the writ-
ing of the present paper, the following sentence by Dean Smith, supra note ii7,
at 459, 46o, has been rediscovered: "Furthermore, through the agency of in-
surance it would be possible to effectuate a spreading of practically all forms of
losses, and it is the opinion of the writer that within the next hundred years
the possibilities of the principle of insurance will lead to very marked changes
in the prevailing attitude towards the whole subject of legal responsibility."
'WARREN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 34; and see also Chapter 9.
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may sit still and say nothing, but that is not curative non-action. With
marriage, conduct directly affects the situation.
There is similarity between the two, in that their validity can be
questioned in a collateral proceeding, as distinguished from one in
rem. But even this fails, for the collateral procedure is exclusive in
the law's case.
What shall be said of the position of the questionable law and of
the marriage doubted for civil disability, before any type of decision
of invalidity has been given? Even where a law is patently in conflict
with a constitutional prohibition, if no one raises the question in a"case",
can the law be treated by interested persons as a nullity? If most persons
approved it and acted in accordance with it, but a few disapproved,
the advocates conceivably might acquiesce ir the ignoring of it by the
few in order to prevent their securing an adverse decision. "The
good sought in unconstitutional legislation", says Chief Justice Taft,
"is an insidious feature, because it leads citizens and legislators of
good purpose to promote it, without thought of the serious breach it
will make in the ark of our covenant..."' But constitutionality is
often a close question dependent upon innumerable factors, is often
much more than the simple "determination of the existence of har-
mony or conflict between two legal texts..."' So, in the case of
the patently questionable law and of the law whose invalidity is
doubtful, persons will continue to act until a decision of invalidity.
That is, a law declared unconstitutional has meaning for use, whereas
a law-not-yet-declared-invalid is not an indispensable concept. This
opinion does not conflict with the statement that "every man is his
own constructionist".' It does counteract a possible implication from
the statement, that the law as it issues id impregnated with invalidity.
The meaning, however, is this: one is his own constructionist at his
peril of guessing rightly, lest by later court, decision he suffer for his
distorted prevision. "Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak,
will not do", says Sir Frederick Pollock.' No more will proof of in-
validity in the mind of the citizen do. The only proof that avails
must be directed to the minds of the judges. Its effect, as manifested
in a judicial decision, is the significant thing.
A marriage under civil disability is said to be void. And in the
case of marriage with a person completely insane, void ipso facto
without court decree to that effect. A law not yet declared invalid
'Child Labor Tax Case, supra note I5a, at 37, 42 Sup Ct., at 450.
'Bikl6, mtpra note 76, at 6.
'Norwood v. Goldsmith, supra note 71, at 234, 53 So., at 87.
1'POLLOCK, THE LAW oF ToRTs, (I3th ed. 1929) 468.
r
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may be an unnecessary concept, but not so a marriage of this type
before a decision. The unhappy position of offspring at once comes
to mind. Even so, the necessity argument in favor of equity juris-
diction to decree nullity emphasized the importance of a decree or of
a persuasive collateral finding against the marriage. Hence the effect
of a sentence of nullity, how it operates, is equally as important as
the situation of the parties before sentence.
Comparing a questioned law to a marriage, defective for im-
potency or consanguinity, we found this point in common, both are
valid until a court decides otherwise. But this breaks down, for the
decision cannot be effective against the law as such, against these
marriages the decision must be of this type. In other respects, the
impossibility of collateral attack upon the marriage and the ability
of the parties thereto directly to affect their situation by conduct,
the case of the law presents a contrast.
IV. SUMMATIONAL
Examination into the bases of judicial power to try the validity of
laws and of marriages has elicited this common factor : each is rooted
in necessity.
Concerning the modes of exercising the power in the two cases,
a contrast was presented: whereas, direct action may always be se-
cured against, a marriage of the type considered, against the law only
"collateral" attack is permissible.
The quality of a decision of invalidity is dependent upon the nature
of the available remedy. We found there contrast and similarity: in
the case of the law, a complainant had to be satisfied with a decision
"in personam"; against some defective marriages he had a choice of
"in personam" or "in rem" relief; against others, he was confined to
an assault "in rem".
Llkewise, with respect to the substantive effects of invalidity, we
had both similarity and contrast. Against marriages the decree of
nullity operates retrospectively. So, some courts hold, does the de-
cision of unconstitutionality affect the law. Statutes providing for
prospective decrees of nullity have their counterparts in decisions
holding laws invalid from the time of the decision.
Finally, it was submitted, that the position of importance properly
accredited to the void marriage, not yet so pronounced, is undeserved
in the case of the law, not yet declared invalid.
To the query with which this effort is titled, we may answer in
the words of an eminent jurisconsult and mentor: "A little, but not
too much."
